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 “History, Memory, and Moral Knowledge:  
William Godwin’s Essay on Sepulchres (1809)”1 
 
 
 “Milton! Thou shouldst be living at this hour. 
England hath need of thee…” 
- Wordsworth, “London, 1802” (1807) 
  
It is a scholarly commonplace that Postmodernity’s disquiet with historical (and 
other) metanarratives can be attributed to, among other things, the twentieth century 
failure of the so-called ‘Enlightenment Project’. In this view, the world wars, 
genocides and Holocaust of the last century contributed profoundly to a general loss 
of faith in descriptions of historical ‘progress’ which privileged human rationality and 
benevolence or descriptions which posited necessary, scientific laws of historical 
change. Yet eighteenth century modernity had its equivalent cataclysm. At its outset, 
the French Revolution was seen by both liberal advocates and conservative 
opponents as the inevitable outcome of Enlightenment rationalism and reformism. 
And the subsequent bloody course of the Revolution and the European wars which 
issued from it provided cause for a fundamental revisioning of eighteenth century 
notions of history as a teleological process leading to ever-increasing knowledge, 
liberty and happiness. Scholars in the burgeoning field of memory studies remark 
how a memorializing urge usually accompanies just such a crisis of tradition or 
historical self-understanding.2 In his Essay on Sepulchres3 (1809) the radical 
English philosopher, novelist and historian William Godwin sought a new perceptual 
 2
n as a 
moral philosopher and historian. 
Reason and Progress 
e basis 
nd guarantor of personal integrity and social felicity. Progress is inevitable: 
 
and historiographical mode with which to legitimate and nurture his own moral sense 
and hopes for the future. Godwin’s essay proposed a scheme to mark the burial 
spots of the morally great – with a simple wooden plaque – in order to enable the 
public to most effectively “commune” with their “ghost[s]” (24). Yet the figures he 
wished to memorialise do not represent stages in a typical eighteenth century 
historical narrative expressing the gradual emancipation of the individual, the 
democratization of institutional life and the progress of science, that is, of the 
relentless, onward march of freedom and enlightenment. Godwin’s heroes – 
“reformers, instructors and improvers” (6) all – were ultimately selected for their 
ongoing capacity to morally animate, energise, and modify posterity with their 
personal qualities. He argued that we are to experience them not as ossified 
specimens of History’s libertarian dynamic, but as exemplary fellow citizens of, and 
companions in, an atemporal community of the living and the dead. This paper 
explores Godwin’s activity in Essay on Sepulchres in terms of his evolutio
 
 
It is well known that Godwin's magnum opus, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 
(1793) is stocked with the characteristic concerns and orientations of Rational 
Dissent.4 In Political Justice, Godwin proposed the human essence as immaterial 
and ratiocinative and the untrammelled exercise of private judgement as th
a
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 The vices and moral 
weakness of man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, or in other 
y 
fficacious – calculation and consideration.8 Given such an ideally rational cosmos, 
Sound reasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must 
always be victorious over error: Sound reasoning and truth are cap
of being so communicated: Truth is omnipotent:
words susceptible of perpetual improvement.5  
 
For Godwin, the natural, unfettered operation of reason led to the adoption of true or 
rational ideas. He insisted that an individual’s response to true ideas was as 
universal and necessary as human responses to other stimuli: “…no man ever 
imagined, that we were free to feel or not to feel an impression made upon our 
organs, and to believe or not to believe a proposition demonstrated to our 
understanding.”6 Godwin, then, like many in the tradition of Protestant Dissent, was 
an adherent of rational intuitionism: moral truths are self-evident and propositional, 
like the truths of mathematics and geometry.7 Like Locke, he assumed two senses of 
‘reason’. First, it was the inherent and recognisable character of the universe which 
humans naturally attempt to emulate or participate in. Second, it was an instrumental 
faculty granting the individual the capacity for efficacious – and especially sociall
e
Godwin’s faith in the omnipotence of truth and human perfectibility is unsurprising.  
 
Yet we do not generally observe the automatic adoption and expression of truth thus 
suggested. And we do not, Godwin averred, because people seldom attain a 
“perfectly voluntary” state of consciousness. Most human action, as Godwin admitted 
in the second edition of Political Justice, is “imperfectly voluntary.”9 Such actions are 
indeed based on judgment and foresight, but not on “judgements extant to…[our] 
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d eccentric rationalist, as did his related fear 
f the potential for human character to be modified in unconscious and unregulated 
understanding,” that is, “attended with consciousness.” For the most part, people do 
not consciously deliberate on each and every situation that occurs, but generalize 
from past experience and employ the decisions which seemed appropriate at that 
time.10 Adherence to generalizations, then – be these legal codes, moral dogma or 
common sense “rules of thumb” – cannot guarantee just or moral outcomes in 
specific cases. And all cases are specific.11 Moreover, if individuals ought not to rely 
on habit, prejudice or tradition, nor should they rely on instinct and emotion. 
Godwin’s example became notorious. He proposed that if a building containing a 
member of one’s family and the celebrated social critic and author Archbishop 
Fénelon were on fire and only one person could be saved, then rational deliberation 
would lead us to the incontrovertible decision to save the Archbishop, as his survival 
would logically contribute more to the public good than that of one’s wife or mother.12 
Godwin's apparent callousness with regard to 'normal' human impulses did much to 
cement his reputation as an unfeeling an
o
ways through mere social intercourse.13 
 
Furthermore, it is this insistence on the dispassionate, rational evaluation of 
information, or “moral arithmetic”14 which has led, understandably, to the tendency 
among scholars to classify Godwin as fundamentally a utilitarian.15 For it is only as 
individuals exercise their faculties independently upon every occasion that optimal 
moral outcomes are comprehended. Yet although he did suggest, on occasions, that 
rational independence was valuable primarily for its utilitarian outcomes, the 
overwhelming sense in Political Justice is the reverse: an individual’s disposition or 
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er 
ependent. He must consult his own reason, draw his own 
conclusions, and conscientiously conform himself to his ideas of propriety. 
aracter or identity being continually constructed and nurtured through, 
osition is essential to an act attaining truly moral status.16 And the quality
ter most expressive or definitive of personal integrity is rational independ
Man is a being who can never be an object of just approbation, any furth
than he is ind
Without this, he will be neither active, nor considerate, nor resolute, nor 
generous.17  
 
Thus, as we approach this “perfectly voluntary state,” of perception, cognition, 
deliberation and action, we approach “the perfection of the human character.”18 
Godwin was primarily interested in individual moral character; and one of his 
objectives in Political Justice was to marry social utility to a particular vision of 
rational and moral autonomy, one derived in large part from the Dissenting tradition. 
This was a complex task made more difficult by Godwin’s subsequent attempts to 
incorporate into his utopian vision the terminology, if not the underlying substance, of 
moral sense philosophy and the literature of sensibility.19 The second and third 
editions of Political Justice (1796, 1798), along with Godwin’s other writings of the 
1790s and early 1800s, evidence an attempt to stress the extent to which humanity’s 
perceptual and moral faculties are, properly, emotional and physiological, rather than 
ratiocinative. Of particular importance is Godwin’s rehabilitation of sympathy as an 
essential and productive element in moral life. Godwin came to see that personal 
morality and social progress consisted not in our capacity to disengage our rational 
essence from emotional, social and sensory pressures, but precisely in our 
personality, ch
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nd motivated by, such modificatory inputs. And of particular importance here were 
he Puritan regicides and radical sectaries of the 1640s from whom 
rice and his fellow Dissenters traced their religious descent.22 In so arguing, Burke 
a
the close, physically proximate relationships individuals ordinarily enjoy with friends 
and family.20  
 
While Godwin’s, so to speak, Dissenting moral theory thus became substantially 
revised and complicated, the 3rd edition of Political Justice remained underpinned by 
a typical Rationalist and Protestant historiography. As Gary Handwerk puts it: 
“Political Justice presumes that history is essentially and irreversibly progressive, its 
shape linear and evolutionary…Any genuine use of reason thus fosters humanity’s 
inherent momentum toward a standard of perfection in personal and social 
conduct.”21 Such a view was especially pronounced among Rational Dissenters and 
their intellectual fellow-travellers. It was, of course, the Dissenting minister Richard 
Price’s published sermon, “Discourse on the love of our country” (1789) which 
prompted Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Burke 
objected vehemently to Price’s equation of England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 
with the revolution then underway in France. He maintained that the revolutionary 
principles expressed by Price were continuous not with those of 1688, but with those 
espoused by t
P
appealed to, and reinvigorated, a long tradition of suspicion and enmity towards 
Dissenters.23  
 
For Godwin, modern progress depended in large part on the Protestant Reformation, 
an event which fortuitously terminated an intellectual dark age presided over by the 
Catholic Church.24 Yet for Godwin, as for many other Dissenters, the libertarian 
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1640s and 1650s as a central and positive moment in 
e story of modern Britain and subsequent history as, ideally, an open-ended 
e of all 
dynamic of the Reformation was unfulfilled. The scientist, theologian and historian 
Joseph Priestley, for example, insisted that the Reformation never really happened 
in England – except briefly under Edward VI. For from the time of Henry VIII, there 
had been no effective improvement in the “religious liberty” which he saw as the 
essence of the Reformation.25 Certainly, Dissenters’ perceptions of British history 
were at odds with the popularly-accepted version proposed by the conservative and 
sceptical David Hume.26 For Hume, British culture had gone far enough in the 
direction of religious and any other liberty. Indeed, the Scotsman maintained that the 
Settlement of 1689, from which Englishmen drew their enviable liberties, privileges 
and rights, was one in which an admirable balance had been struck between the 
oppressiveness and superstition of Catholicism and despotism on the one hand, and 
the all too recent experience of republicanism and Puritanism on the other.27 Clearly, 
Hume's narrative excluded the more developed or radical sentiments of 
Nonconformist or Dissenting Whiggery which saw the Puritan revolution and 
republican experiment of the 
th
process characterised by ever-increasing quanta of moral, intellectual and political 
liberty.  
 
For Price, the Glorious, American and French Revolutions evidenced a progressive 
dynamic underlying modernity.28 In Political Justice, Godwin was similarly optimistic 
that the accumulation and refinement of knowledge characteristic of recent times 
would necessarily lead to political and moral progress: “there is no science that is not 
capable of additions; there is no art that may not be carried to a still higher 
perfection. If this be true of all other sciences, why not of morals? If this be tru
 8
ther arts, why not of social institution?” With the confidence that the “progress of 
as, of necessity, 
pseudonymous children’s literature. It was work written with both eyes on public 
taste and sales. One work fro ucked this trend and was, he 
ter recalled, “written merely from a private sentiment,” was the Essay on 
Sepulc
 
o
mind” is “natural and regular,” then, he insisted that we ought to learn from, and 
improve upon, the ideas of our ancestors rather than slavishly imitate them.29 
 
While Godwin felt sure that Political Justice “contained the dictates of an 
independent mind,” he also observed that its "doctrines" "coincided in a great degree 
with the sentiments then prevailing in English society.”30  Although few readers 
would have subscribed to the more radical of the Political Justice’s doctrines, 
Godwin’s assessment of the public’s response to the work’s general themes and 
tone appears accurate: Political Justice was generally well-reviewed.31 Yet the 
popularity Godwin initially enjoyed was substantially eroded by the turn of the 
century as a result of a conservative sea-change in thought wrought by government 
vilification and repression of reformist activity during the period of the Revolutionary 
Wars. Godwin had himself specifically contributed to the decline of his reputation 
with his extremely frank biography of his much-loved and incessantly-mourned first 
wife Mary Wollstonecraft, Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman (1798).32 For the decade subsequent to the appearance of his novel 
Fleetwood (1805), the majority of Godwin’s published work w
m this period, which b
la
hres.33  
 
Feeling and Memory 
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t 
is of a 
John Horne Tooke, when if the grosser film were removed from 
his eyes, he might live and sensibly mingle with Socrates, and Plato, and the 
nd spiritual or material and immaterial terms is characteristic of the essay 
s a whole, as are descriptions of communication with the dead. For the dead are 
not rea  
Plato,  
reform
 
vid 
 of spirit which should aspire 
to the boldest improvements in future. The genuine heroes of the times that 
The men that have lived, are they less important than the men of the presen
day? Had their thoughts less of sinew and substance…? …To him who 
mind rightly framed, the world is a thousand times more populous, than to the 
man, to whom every thing that is not flesh and blood, is nothing. I pity the 
being of slender comprehension, who lives only with George the Third, and 
Alexander of Russia, and Wieland, and Schiller, and Kant, and Jeremy 
Bentham, and 
Decii, and the Catos, with Chaucer, and Milton, and Thomas Aquinas, and 
Thomas a Becket, and all the stars that gild our mortal sphere. They are not 
dead….(23)   
 
A number of things in this curious essay are immediately striking. First, Godwin 
desires a society in which the dead and living “sensibly mingle.” This mixing of 
corporeal a
a
lly dead. Second, most of Godwin’s heroes are writers, in the broad sense:
Chaucer, Milton, Aquinas, and so on. Third, Godwin’s objective is decidedly
ist: 
I trust that none of my readers will be erroneous enough to consider the vi
recollection of things past, as hostile to that tone
have been, were the reformers, the instructors, and improvers of their 
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om these admired innovators, but by becoming like them. For Godwin stresses that 
the po
exemp e 
writing
who ha
 
 
d generalities and idle homilies of morality; but 
let them live as my friends, my philosophers, my instructors and my guides!...I 
contemporaries; and he is the sincerest admirer of these men, who most 
earnestly aspires to become ‘like unto them’(6). 
 
Godwin was writing during a time of rampant reaction to Enlightenment liberalism 
and progressivism and wanted to stress that his looking to the past was emphatically 
not a conservative project, but one seeking a heritage of innovation - a word 
redolent, in the minds of Burkean conservatives, of revolutionary and un-British 
sympathies. As will be shown, however, the reformatory impetus Godwin sought in 
the past had little to do with those conceptions of rational and scientific 
progressivism with which his work is most usually associated. And Godwin's 
repudiation of such notions of progress and the historical narratives which typically 
accompanied them is intimately linked to the unusual subject and diction of Essay on 
Sepulchres. He emphasises how future improvement is to be sought not by learning
fr
litical force or moral value to be gained from the remembrance of the 
lary dead is not merely a recollection of abstract moral lessons drawn from th
s or recorded character of these people, nor is it (simply) a veneration of those 
ve contributed to an ongoing process of knowledge-building enlightenment.  
I would say, with Ezekiel, the Hebrew, in his Vision, ‘Let these dry bones live!”
Not let them live merely in col
am not satisfied only to call them up by a strong effort of the imagination, but I 
would have them, and men like them, ‘around my path, and around my bed,’ 
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d departed (22). 
st case)…the wife of my bosom” (8-10). As part of his revised moral thought, 
odwin had come to admit that sense-experiences had a superior (and often 
salutar
depen  
the virt  the 
site of sed 
friend: 
and not allow myself to hold a more frequent intercourse with the living, than 
with the goo
 
Godwin suggests that we ought to pursue a contact with these great dead 
approximating, as nearly as possible, the social contact we have with the living –  
and in particular those with whom we are on relatively intimate terms. His conception 
of memory, then, tends away from the purely ideational, and more, so to speak, to 
the necromantic.  
 
Godwin opens the essay with a pre-emptive strike against the potential objection of 
immaterialists that in memorialising the site of the remains of the dead one is 
illogically attending to the incidental “carcass” housing the essential “intellectual 
spirit”(7). He emphasises the “reasonableness, the unavoidableness, of our regard 
for the spot where the remains of a great and excellent man have been deposited” 
by positing this person, in a highly significant move, as a “friend,” even, “(to put the 
stronge
G
y) effect on human motivation.34 Thus, because “man is a creature, who 
ds for his feelings upon the operations of sense,” we are more fully inspired by
uous dead where we can visit the places they frequented, and particularly,
their death or interment (20).35 He remarks, of our responses to this decea
 
I am more inclined to the opinion of the immaterialists; than of the materialists. 
But my acquaintance with the thoughts and the virtues of my friend, has been 
 12
e senses (9). Because our 
lationship was mediated and experienced physically, the physical remnants of our 
friend  
our frie  
reason  
which be 
directe mnants of his person: 
ngible evidence of our friend’s existence, like our own 
ith in the endurance of his immaterial essence, survives only in subjective 
intellec e 
depart  
diseng
made through my eyes and my ears…I can never separate my idea of his 
peculiarities and his actions, from my idea of his person. I cannot love my 
friend without loving his person (8). 
 
While the essence and identity of an individual is ultimately intellectual or non-
corporeal, identities or individuals can only connect with and meaningfully 
experience one another through the medium of th
re
and the place of their interment thus become “sacred” to us. The essence of
nd may be immaterial and we may through purely cerebral “deductions of
ing” or “suggestions of faith” envisage the survival of “the thinking principle
animated him,” but our strongest and most profound sentiments will 
d towards the physical re
 
It is our only reality. The solidity of the rest, the works of my friend, the words, 
the actions, the conclusions of his reasoning and the suggestions of faith, we 
feel to depend, as far as they are solid to us, upon the operations of our own 
mind. They stand, and are the sponsors, for my friend; but what the grave 
incloses is himself (10). 
 
Godwin observes that the ta
fa
tion or memory. Such artefacts, like memories, merely signify the reality of th
ed friend – the unanimated physical remains seem more real. But these
aged signifiers are also conduits to the real. Indeed, everything tangible with 
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his hab
  
The value of these as having been his, is not merely fictitious; they have an 
y, Godwin seems to 
uggest that the moral character of the dead can be transmitted to posterity through 
intimate relationship with the persons of Milton or Plato? As W. H. Auden once 
our friend was associated has significance: “his ring, his watch, his books, and
itation.” He goes on, 
empire over my mind; they can make me happy or unhappy; they can torture, 
and they can tranquillise; they can purify my sentiments, and make me similar 
to the man I love; they possess the virtue which the Indian is said to attribute 
to the spoils of him he kills, and inspires me with the powers, the feelings and 
the heart of their preceding master (8). 
 
It has been shown how in his revisions to Political Justice, and in novels like Caleb 
Williams (1794) and St Leon (1799), Godwin exhibits a strong attraction to Hume’s 
notion that ideas and sentiments could be automatically, physiologically transmitted 
– via the natural faculty of sympathy – between physically proximate individuals, 
especially intimate friends and family members.36 Analogousl
s
physical or material media. And the most conducive of these is the most real – the 
site of the bodily remains. Godwin thus seeks the “friendship” of the “Illustrious Dead 
of All Ages” (22). In visiting the tombs of the great dead we “indulge all the reality we 
can now have, of a sort of conference with these men, by repairing to the scene 
which, as far as they are at all on earth, they still inhabit!” (12).  
 
While we can all understand why, in grief, we may wish to rekindle our relationship 
with a deceased friend or family member, why ought we wish to seek such an 
 14
I would like to have been an intimate friend of his!'"37 
urely the important thing about these figures – as far as we are concerned – is their 
work: . 
For in  
merely  
‘works
 
ives, 
 application of his experience, the 
counsels he could give, the firmness and sagacity with which he could have 
commented: "Reading a poet whose work I admire, it is only very seldom that I find 
myself wishing: 'Oh, how 
S
their art, their ideas, rather than their person. Godwin would have disagreed
 an important sense, an individual's artistic and intellectual productions are
 evidence of their greatness, of their essential, inimitable spirit. And while the
’ remain, the spirit is gone.  
When a great and excellent man dies, the chief part of what he was (at least 
so far as this world is concerned) perishes. It is very little of him that surv
in his memory, and his works. The use and
executed what he might have thus counselled, are gone…It is impossible to 
calculate how much of good perishes, when a great and excellent man dies. It 
is owing to this calamity of death, that the world for ever is, and in some 
degree for ever must be, in its infancy (8). 
 
Death has not taken from us Plato’s or Milton’s ‘knowledge’ – in the usual sense. 
This continues to exist in Symposium or Paradise Lost – but these works are a 
relatively insignificant part of the great man. What we have lost are the active, 
practical capacities, the unique moral and intellectual energy and acuity of the dead 
genius. Tillotama Rajan comments that in his revision of Wollstonecraft’s life and 
work “Godwin…writes Wollstonecraft’s legacy not as a set of ideas, but as the 
sensibility that subtends them.” Godwin thus "thinks of ‘genius’ as power rather than 
knowledge, as a capacity to respond and initiate."38 In a sense, Wollstonecraft’s 
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orks,” we lose the vast majority of her as a unique person with 
e capacity to inform, inspire and modify our own character through that insensible, 
essence underpinning the literary, scientific 
nd philosophical achievements of the great dead. Knowledge in the form of 
genius lies not in her texts, but in the honesty and intensity of her spirit of which the 
texts are evidence, instances or effervescence. Indeed, this is precisely how notable 
readers of Wollstonecraft have engaged with her, as Pamela Clemit points out.39 
Godwin does not, then, wish to resurrect Milton so that he can teach us how to be 
committed seventeenth century Puritan republicans, or Aquinas so that we can 
better become theologically-informed medieval Catholics. We don’t require Milton’s 
knowledge – which is really the application of his genius to his own highly specific 
historical circumstances. The passage quoted immediately above implies that we 
need Milton himself, as Wordsworth famously remarked. Knowledge, as usually 
understood, is of limited value; and contrary to Godwin’s earlier faith in cumulative 
knowledges as the basis of progress, there is now little cause for optimism. While we 
may retain an idea or memory of an individual’s talents or evidence of these in 
writings and other “w
th
sympathetic modification which only physical proximity to, or relationship with, the 
living can enable. Indeed, says Godwin, humanity tends to learn little across the 
ages for in every generation we effectively have another class of first graders starting 
from scratch (14n.). 
 
For Godwin, then, historically-accumulated knowledge cannot be relied upon to 
secure progress. He comes instead to insist upon the resuscitation of the moral 
energy, the dynamic character, the living 
a
generally-formulated “designs and maxims” will not save us; but good people might. 
That is, progress depends on moral knowledge conceived as a living capacity or 
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ossessions, then perhaps proximate exposure to the remains of the great dead may 
allow u of 
our de  
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 Virgil have descended to us, 
undefaced, undismembered, and complete. I can dwell upon them for days 
energy, the vital character and capacity necessary to conceive, express and enact 
grand projects and think great thoughts.  
 
If the essence, the spirit, the virtue of our deceased friend can be resuscitated, 
experienced and absorbed as we encounter her physical remain
p
s to imbibe their spirit. But we will recall that we can re-experience the spirit 
parted friend precisely because she already was our intimate. How can we
similar intimacy with the great dead whom we have never met? In descr
ese great dead are, Godwin reveals how this is to be achieved.   
Military and naval achievements are of temporary operation: the victories of 
Cimon and Scipio are passed away; these great heroes have dwindled into a 
name; but whole Plato, and Xenophon, and
and for weeks: I am acquainted with their peculiarities; their inmost thoughts 
are familiar to me; they appear before me with all the attributes of individuality; 
I can ruminate upon their lessons and sentiments, till my whole soul is lighted 
up with the spirit of these authors (28-29).  
 
In preferring literary figures over the military heroes so much more usually idolized 
by the generality, Godwin doubtless betrays his own conceptions of greatness. But 
he has another reason to prefer the memorialisation of writers. In the usual, 
ideational sense of public memory the work of writers obviously has the potential to 
outlive the person. But, crucially, because of the extensiveness, detail and 
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h most closely to the 
ore telling and significant modes of normal social life. Proper moral knowledge is 
complexity of great writing, the “whole” personality producing these has, in some 
sense, “descended to us, undefaced, undismembered, and complete.” Great writing 
is of value here not because it embodies, preserves or presents eternal – or even 
useful – truths, but because it gives us access to the complete, complex, fully human 
individuals who produced these “lessons and sentiments.” These are individuals with 
whom we can have ‘normal’ relations and from whom we can absorb moral direction, 
sustenance and energy. Moral knowledge is not, then, simply an Arnoldian matter of 
becoming acquainted with the best that has been thought and said, anymore than 
(proper) memory is merely an unimpassioned and ideational conceptualization of 
dead people and their achievements (nor progress of standing on the shoulders of 
giants). For Godwin, memory is a matter of becoming acquainted, intimately, with 
those people who have thought and said these things. As we thus enter into more 
fully human relations with them, our character is affected and modified in those 
imperceptible, sympathetic and imitative ways which approac
m
not a passively downloaded database of the moral principles or teachings, the “cold 
generalities and idle homilies of morality,” of the great. Rather, moral knowledge 
derives from an intimate and imitative relationship with authors who function as “my 
friends, my philosophers, my instructors and my guides!” (22). 
 
J. B. Schneewind outlines how Anglophone moral discourse after (Godwin’s 
contemporary) Jeremy Bentham fell into two camps – the utilitarian and the 
intuitionist. Intuitionists maintained that the distinctively moral quality of any action 
lay in the motives or intentions of its performer. They insisted that moral truths were 
known instinctively or intuitively and that such knowledge was a motive in its own 
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rally occurs among friends and family, 
mall groups wherein sympathetic understanding is possible and sentiments can be 
exchan
practic oral 
charac
approp
 
His [the moral exemplar’s] knowledge of what to do cannot be put into any set 
truth and political reform in pursuit of which he turns from philosophical, discursive 
right, provided the will was strong enough to counter any competing motives.40 
Schneewind argues that intuitionism most natu
s
ged intuitively and unreflectively. Moreover, he tells us that in educational 
e intuitionists relied on the so-called “pattern person” – exemplary m
ters – often fictitious – from whom children could intuitively and imaginatively 
riate moral awareness and know-how.  
of explicit formulae, just as the know-how of the skilled craftsman or artist 
cannot be summed up verbally. Consequently, to understand and to follow the 
model, sympathy and intuition are necessary - the one enabling us to grasp 
his hidden motives, the other showing us the rightness of his practice.41 
 
The special value of appropriating and exemplifying such an ideal ‘character’ – rather 
than learning a set of general moral rules – is that one is thus habitually or 
constitutionally disposed to react morally in any situation. In Political Justice Godwin 
insisted that such automatic and appropriately-directed moral behaviour was 
guaranteed by an independent character. Therewith an individual could evaluate the 
exigencies of each situation rationally without relying on (probably) inappropriate 
habits, instincts and static, generalised moral or legal codes. As such, rational 
autonomy was the guarantee of moral and political progress. While exchanging an 
intuitionism based in disengaged rational autonomy for one more reliant on the 
sympathetic exchange of feelings and ideas, Godwin remains committed to moral 
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ngagement with exemplary historical and fictional characters provides us 
ot with a set of static principles or behaviours to apply rigidly to our own lives, but 
with a n 
be em  
observ
 
Since the model person responds to the uniqueness of each individual with 
’s 
vised approach in Essay on Sepulchres is one which is both less orthodoxly 
analysis to the detailed, particularist narratives of history, biography and fiction.42 
Personal e
n
sensibility and energy appropriate to a variety of circumstances and which ca
ployed in the critique and reform of established practice. As Schneewind
es: 
the uniquely right action, he is beyond rules; and an appeal to what he would 
think or do can therefore serve as support for the criticism or modification of a 
rule that has become rigid and lifeless.43 
 
Recent scholarship has drawn attention to Godwin’s growing critique of 
Enlightenment philosophical history and his exchange of historical grand narratives 
for studies emphasizing particularity and contingency.44 Certainly the progressivist 
view to which he had subscribed was under stress from anti-Enlightenment, post-
Revolution reaction. Moreover, as a Dissenter, Godwin’s relationship with the 
mainstream, Humean conception of moderate progress and qualified liberty was 
always problematic. Jon Klancher alerts us particularly to Godwin’s efforts to 
undermine the generalising sweep of Enlightenment historiography uniformly 
employed in the defence and celebration of the Whig Settlement of 1689.45 Godwin
re
Whiggish and more radical. He tends to reject the teleological vision of the gradual 
emancipation of the individual, the democratization of institutional life and the 
progress of reason and science. In its place he proposes a less totalizing version.  
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tructural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep 
 
In her study of Godwin's The Lives of Edward and John Philips, Nephews and Pupils 
of Milton (1815) Tillotama Rajan points out how Godwin replaces his erstwhile 
Whiggish sense of history as “linear, unified and progressive” with one more akin to 
Foucault’s rhizomic “genealogy” – a particularist structure or focus which is 
consequently less susceptible to totalising interpretations and more accommodating 
of contingency.46 Like Rajan, I find Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome a useful trope 
with which to understand some of Godwin’s historiographical and biographical 
practices. Much of Western thought and perception is dominated or determined by 
the image of the tree. The "arborescent" or tree structure embodies an image of 
cumulative growth and hierarchy in which multiplicity ultimately depends on, and 
must be understood in terms of, a unitary fundamental “One.”47 To this, Deleuze and 
Guattari oppose another natural image: the “rhizome” – an expression of dynamic 
multiplicity which cannot be reduced to, or described in terms of, a totalizing, 
concretizing unity. Grass is a rhizome: in uprooting any section, the health of the 
system or network as a whole is unimpeded. A system of subterranean burrows is 
also a rhizome. It may be entered and exited at a variety of points. "Any point of a 
rhizome can be connected to any thing other, and must be. This is very different from 
the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order.”48 The figure of the rhizome 
enables us to conceive dynamic systems as not, ultimately, static concrete entities 
with perfect, complete, reductive signification: “…a rhizome is not amenable to any
s
structure.” In “tree logic” we represent things and place them, reductively, in a 
hierarchical, totalizing order. Thus, "the rhizome is an anti-genealogy” opposed to the 
uni-directionality of movement and the privileging of specific components or units.49  
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ems, they are 
ntryways and exits, impasses the child lives out politically, in other words, with all 
 
For Godwin, the structural characteristic of history is not a neatly progressive 
narrative in which liberty, reason and enlightenment become ever more evident, 
normative and privileged. The cataclysm of the French Revolution had obviously put 
paid to many of the optimistic and progressivist notions of Enlightenment – as 
conservatives and moderate Whigs since Burke have been fond of pointing out. 
Godwin finds much to recommend this more pessimistic, anti-Whiggish view. But in 
rejecting Whiggism’s uni-directional, teleological, even necessitarian vision, Godwin 
– at least in Essay on Sepulchres – still insists on freedom and reason as the highest 
aspirations and most noble features of humankind. But he no longer sees these 
qualities as the structuring dynamic of a total historical narrative. Rather, he sees 
history rhizomically: instances of moral and intellectual energy occur sporadically in 
particular individual characters and in particular epochs. But as Deleuze and Guattari 
remind us: "There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a 
structure, tree, or root. There are only lines.”50 Therefore nothing is privileged, there 
is no hierarchy: every thing connects to everything else, remaining potentially 
connected to, and accessible by, everything else. Like the components of an 
individual's psychological history, historical processes and events should not be seen 
as crudely determining and thus disempowering of the present: the “drives and part-
objects [established by psychoanalysis] are neither stages on a genetic axis nor 
positions in a deep structure; they are political options for probl
e
the force of his or her desire.”51 The 'historical' lives on not as a rigidly determining 
component of the present but as a perennially available resource for the 
appropriation of moral knowledge and the exercise of political action. 
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 – a term 
onstituting the English republic as an interruption to the normal, proper 
moral and intellectual potential 
f the human species, we need to access historical persons, rather than merely 
 
One of the historical 'points' at which Godwin prefers to access these moral 
resources is, unsurprisingly, the Puritan Republic of the mid-seventeenth century, 
the Republic’s Parliamentary leaders  – or "master spirits" – among his pantheon of 
the great dead.52 With this egregious exception, he insists, English history presents 
an endless trail of moral mediocrity, brutality and corruption.53 The British 
mainstream tended to designate the republican period the Interregnum
c
(monarchical) state of things, a curious, inconsequential and immoral (and, for that 
latter reason alone, instructive) digression or footnote in an otherwise seamless 
narrative exhibiting the unfolding of a peculiarly British form of progress. 
 
Godwin comes to agree. The Puritan moment is an interruption, a spectacular 
eruption of virtue, an instance of the profoundly aporetic. It doesn’t represent a stage 
in the onward march of freedom and enlightenment. There is no such onward march. 
And for this reason, Godwin insists that such undoubted instances of individual and 
corporate virtue be perennially accessible. Things are not improving naturally or 
inevitably, as it were. And if we are to retain the real 
o
memorialize or memorize their works – the laws, dictums, institutions and 
knowledges that inevitably limit our capacity to live truly moral lives. In a sense, the 
immortality of such persons is essential to progress.  
 
The possibility of human immortality was one of the more derided and readily 
dismissed elements of Political Justice. Siobhan Ni Chonaill astutely notes how 
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ing from the world persons 
of genius and knowledge.” 54 It would seem, then, that Godwin had early sensed that 
 celebrated by 
r 
this trepidation had become explicit.   
Godwin saw immortality less as an outcome of progress than as a precondition for it: 
“For Godwin, death places a constraint on progress by tak
the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge observed, practiced and
radicals and reformers of the late Enlightenment was not a sufficient condition fo
progress. By 1809 
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